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Abstract
Classifier evasion consists in finding for a given
instance x the “nearest” instance x′ such that the
classifier predictions of x and x′ are different.
We present two novel algorithms for systemati-
cally computing evasions for tree ensembles such
as boosted trees and random forests. Our first
algorithm uses a Mixed Integer Linear Program
solver and finds the optimal evading instance un-
der an expressive set of constraints. Our second
algorithm trades off optimality for speed by us-
ing symbolic prediction, a novel algorithm for
fast finite differences on tree ensembles. On a
digit recognition task, we demonstrate that both
gradient boosted trees and random forests are
extremely susceptible to evasions. Finally, we
harden a boosted tree model without loss of pre-
dictive accuracy by augmenting the training set
of each boosting round with evading instances, a
technique we call adversarial boosting.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) represent a prominent suc-
cess of machine learning. These models can successfully
and accurately address difficult learning problems, includ-
ing classification of audio, video, and natural language pos-
sible where previous approaches have failed. Yet, the ex-
istence of evading instances for the current incarnation of
DNNs (Szegedy et al., 2013) shows a perhaps surprising
brittleness: for virtually any instance x that the model clas-
sifies correctly, it is possible to find a negligible perturba-
tion δ such that x+ δ evades being correctly classified, that
is, receives a (sometimes widely) inaccurate prediction.
The general study of the evasion problem matters on both
conceptual and practical grounds. First, we expect a high-
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performance learning algorithm to generalize well and be
hard to evade: only a “large enough” perturbation δ should
be able to alter its decision. The existence of small-δ evad-
ing instances shows a defect in the generalization ability of
the model, and hints at improper model class and/or insuffi-
cient regularization. Second, machine learning is becoming
the workhorse of security-oriented applications, the most
prominent example being unwanted content filtering. In
those applications, the attacker has a large incentive for
finding evading instances. For example, spammers look
for small, cost-effective changes to their online content to
avoid detection and removal.
While prior work extensively studies the evasion problem
on differentiable models by means of gradient descent,
those results are reported in an essentially qualitative fash-
ion, implicitly defaulting the choice of metric for measur-
ing δ to the L2 norm. Further, non-differentiable, non-
continuous models have received very little attention. Tree
sum-ensembles as produced by boosting or bagging are
perhaps the most important models from this class as they
are often able to achieve competitive performance and en-
joy good adoption rates in both industrial and academic
contexts.
In this paper, we develop two novel exact and approximate
evasion algorithms for sum-ensemble of trees. Our exact
(or optimal) evasion algorithm computes the smallest δ ac-
cording to the Lp norm for p = 0, 1, 2,∞ such that the
model misclassifies x+ δ. The algorithm relies on a Mixed
Integer Linear Program solver and enables precise quanti-
tative robustness statements. We benchmark the robustness
of boosted trees and random forests on a concrete hand-
written digit classification task by comparing the minimal
required perturbation δ across many representative models.
Those models include L1 and L2 regularized logistic re-
gression, max-ensemble of linear classifiers (shallow max-
out network), a 3-layer deep neural network and a classic
RBF-SVM. The comparison shows that for this task, de-
spite their competitive accuracies, tree ensembles are con-
sistently the most brittle models across the board.
Finally, our approximate evasion algorithm is based on
ar
X
iv
:1
50
9.
07
89
2v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
7 M
ay
 20
16
Evasion and Hardening of Tree Ensemble Classifiers
symbolic prediction, a fast and novel method for comput-
ing finite differences for tree ensemble models. We use
this method for generating more than 11 million synthetic
confusing instances and incorporate those during gradi-
ent boosting in an approach we call adversarial boosting.
This technique produces a hardened model which is signif-
icantly harder to evade without loss of accuracy.
2. Related Work
From the onset of the adversarial machine learning sub-
field, evasion is recognized as part of the larger family of at-
tacks occurring at inference time: exploratory attacks (Bar-
reno et al., 2006). While there is a prolific literature consid-
ering the evasion of linear or otherwise differentiable mod-
els (Dalvi et al., 2004; L., 2005; Lowd & Meek, 2005; Nel-
son et al., 2012; Bru¨ckner et al., 2012; Fawzi et al., 2014;
Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2013; Srndic & Laskov,
2014), we are only aware of a single paper tackling the case
of tree ensembles. In Xu et al. (Xu et al., 2016), the authors
present a genetic algorithm for finding malicious PDF in-
stances which evade detection.
In this paper, we forgo application-specific feature extrac-
tion and directly work in feature space. We briefly dis-
cuss strategies for modeling the feature extraction step in
paragraph additional constraints of section 4.3. We de-
liberately do not limit the amount of information available
for carrying out evasion. In this paper, our goal is to estab-
lish the intrinsic evasion robustness of the machine learning
models themselves, and thus provide a guaranteed worst-
case lower-bound. In contrast to (Xu et al., 2016), our ex-
act algorithm guarantees optimality of the solution, and our
approximate algorithm performs a fast coordinate descent
without the additional tuning and hyper-parameters that a
genetic algorithm requires.
We contrast our paper with a few related papers on deep
neural networks, as these are the closest in spirit to the
ideas developed here. Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow et al.,
2014) hypothesize that evasion in practical deep neural net-
works is possible because these models are locally lin-
ear. However, this paper demonstrates that despite their
extreme non-linearity, boosted trees are even more sus-
ceptible to evasion than neural networks. On the harden-
ing side, Goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow et al., 2014) in-
troduce a regularization penalty term which simulates the
presence of evading instances at training time, and show
limited improvements in both test accuracy and robustness.
Gu et al. (Gu & Rigazio, 2015) show preliminary results
by augmenting deep neural networks with a pre-filtering
layer based on a form of contractive auto-encoding. Most
recently, Papernot et al. (Papernot et al., 2015) shows the
strong positive effect of distillation on evasion robustness
for neural networks. In this paper, we demonstrate a large
increase in robustness for a boosted tree model hardened
by adversarial boosting. We empirically show that our
method does not degrade accuracy and creates the most ro-
bust model in our benchmark problem.
3. The Optimal Evasion Problem
In this section, we formally introduce the optimal evasion
problem and briefly discuss its relevance to adversarial ma-
chine learning. We follow the definition of (Biggio et al.,
2013). Let c : X → Y be a classifier. For a given instance
x ∈ X and a given “distance” function d : X × X → R+,
the optimal evasion problem is defined as:
minimize
x′∈X
d(x, x′) subject to c(x) 6= c(x′) (1)
In this paper, we focus on binary classifiers defined over
an n-dimensional feature space, that is Y = {−1, 1} and
X ⊂ Rn.
Setting the classifier c aside, the distance function d fully
specifies (1), hence we talk about d-evading instances, or d-
robustness. In fact, many problems of interest in adversar-
ial machine learning fit under formulation (1) with a judi-
cious choice for d. In the adversarial learning perspective,
d can be used to model the cost the attacker has to pay for
changing her initial instance x. In this paper, we proceed
as if this cost is decomposable over the feature dimensions.
In particular, we present results for four representative dis-
tances. We briefly describe those and their typical effects
on the solution of (1).
The L0 distance
∑n
i=1 Ixi 6=x′i , or Hamming distance en-
courages the sparsest, most localized deformations with ar-
bitrary magnitude. Our optimal evasion algorithm can also
handle the case of non-uniform costs over features. This
situation corresponds to minimizing
∑n
i=1 αiIxi 6=x′i where
αi are non-negative weights.
TheL1 distance
∑n
i=1 |xi−x′i| encourages localized de-
formations and additionally controls for their magnitude.
The L2 distance
√∑n
i=1(xi − x′i)2 encourages less lo-
calized but small deformations.
The L∞ distance maxi |xi − x′i| encourages uniformly
spread deformations with the smallest possible magnitude.
Note that for binary-valued features, L1 and L2 reduce to
L0 and L∞ results in the trivial solution value 1 for (1).
4. Evading Tree Ensemble Models
We start by introducing tree ensemble models along with
some useful notation. We then describe our optimal and ap-
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proximate algorithms for generating evading instances on
sum-ensembles of trees.
4.1. Tree Ensembles
A sum-ensemble of trees model f : Rn → R consists of
a set T of regression trees. Without loss of generality, a
regression tree T ∈ T is a binary tree where each inter-
nal node n ∈ T.nodes holds a logical predicate n.predicate
over the feature variables, outgoing node edges are by con-
vention labeled n.true and n.false and finally each leaf
l ∈ T.leaves holds a numerical value l.prediction ∈ R.
For a given instance x ∈ Rn, the prediction path in T is
the path from the tree root to a leaf such that for each in-
ternal node n in the path, n.true is also in the path if and
only if n.predicate is true. The prediction of tree T is the
leaf value of the prediction path. Finally, the signed margin
prediction f(x) of the ensemble model is the sum of all in-
dividual tree predictions and the predicted label is obtained
by thresholding, with the threshold value commonly fixed
at zero: c(x) = 1⇔ f(x) > 0.
In this paper, we consider the case of single-feature thresh-
old predicates of the form xi < τ or equivalently xi > τ ,
where 0 ≤ i < n and τ ∈ R are fixed model parame-
ters. This restriction excludes oblique decision trees where
predicates simultaneously involve several feature variables.
We however note that oblique trees are seldom used in en-
semble classifiers, partially because of their relatively high
construction cost and complexity (Norouzi et al., 2015).
Before describing our generic approach for solving the op-
timal evasion problem, we first state a simple worst-case
complexity result for problem (1).
4.2. Theoretical Hardness of Evasion
For a given tree ensemble model f , finding an x ∈ Rn such
that f(x) > 0 (or f(x) < 0 without loss of generality) is
NP-complete. That is, irrespectively of the choice for d,
the optimal evasion problem (1) requires solving an NP-
complete feasibility subproblem.
We now give a proof of this fact by reduction from 3-SAT.
First, given an instance x, computing the sign of f(x) can
be done in time at most proportional to the model size.
Thus the feasibility problem is in NP. It is further NP-
complete by a linear time reduction from 3-SAT as fol-
lows. We encode in x the assignment of values to the vari-
ables of the 3-SAT instance S. By convention, we choose
xi > 0.5 if and only if variable i is set to true in S. Next,
we construct f by arranging each clause of S as a binary
regression tree. Each regression tree has exactly one inter-
nal node per level, one for each variable appearing in the
clause. Each internal node holds a predicate of the form
xi > 0.5 where i is a clause variable. The nodes are ar-
ranged such that there exists a unique prediction path cor-
responding to the falseness of the clause. For this path, the
prediction value of the leaf is set to the opposite of the num-
ber of clauses in S, which is also the number of trees in the
reduction. The remaining leaves predictions are set to 1.
Figure 1 illustrates this construction on an example.
x0 > .5
T F
x1 > .5
T F
x2 > .5
T F
1
1
1 -13
Figure 1. Regression tree for the clause x0 ∨ ¬x1 ∨ x2. In this
example, S has 13 clauses.
It is easy to see that S is satisfiable if and only if there exists
x such that f(x) > 0. Indeed, a satisfying assignment
for S corresponds to x such that f(x) = |T | > 0 and
any non-satisfying assignment for S corresponds to x such
that f(x) ≤ −1 < 0 because there is at least one false
clause which corresponds to a regression tree which output
is −|T |.
While we can not expect an efficient algorithm for solving
all instances of problem (1) unless P = NP, it may be the
case that tree ensemble models as produced by common
learners such as gradient boosting or random forests are
practically easy to evade. We now turn to an algorithm for
optimally solving the evasion problem when d is one of the
distances presented in section 3.
4.3. Optimal Evasion
Let f be a sum-ensemble of trees as defined in 4.1 and
x ∈ Rn an initial instance. We present a reduction of
problem (1) into a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP).
This reduction avoids introducing constraints with so called
“big-M” constants (Griva et al., 2008) at the cost of a
slightly more complex solution encoding. We experimen-
tally find that our reduction produces tight formulations and
acceptable running times for all common models f .
In what follows, we present the mixed integer program by
defining three groups of MILP variables: the predicate
variables encode the state (true or false) of all predicates,
the leaf variables encode which prediction leaf is active in
each tree, and the optional objective variable for the case
where d is the L∞ norm.
We then introduce three families of constraints: the pred-
icates consistency constraints enforce the logical con-
sistency between predicates, the leaves consistency con-
straints enforce the logical consistency between prediction
leaves and predicates, and the model mislabel constraint
enforces the condition c(x) 6= c(x′), or equivalently that
Evasion and Hardening of Tree Ensemble Classifiers
Figure 2. Regression tree for the reduction example. Predicate
variables p and leaf variables l are shown next to their correspond-
ing internal and leaf nodes. There are n = 2 continuous features.
The leaf predictions are -2, 1, 1 and 2.
f(x′) > 0 or f(x′) < 0 depending on the sign of f(x).
Finally we reduce the objective of (1) by relating the pred-
icate variables to the value of d(x, x′) in objective.
Program Variables For clarity, MILP variables are
bolded and italicized throughout. Our reduction uses three
families of variables.
• At most∑T∈T |T.nodes| binary variables pi ∈ {0; 1}
(predicates) encoding the state of the predicates. Our
implementation sparingly create those variables: if
any two or more predicates in the model are logically
equivalent, their state is represented by a single vari-
able. For example, the state of x′5 < 0 and −x′5 > 0
would be represented by the same variable.
• ∑T∈T |T.leaves| continuous variables 0 ≤ li ≤ 1
(leaves) encoding which prediction leaf is active in
each tree. The MILP constraints force exactly one li
per tree to be non-zero with li = 1. The l variables are
thus implied binary in any solution but are nonethe-
less typed continuous to narrow down the choice
of branching variable candidates during branch-and-
bound, and hence improve solving time.
• At most 1 non-negative continuous variable b (bound)
for expressing the distance d(x, x′) of problem (1)
when d is the L∞ distance. This variable is first used
in the objective paragraph.
In what follows, we illustrate our reduction by using a
model with a single regression tree as represented in fig-
ure 2.
Predicates consistency Without loss of generality, each
predicate variable pi corresponds to the state of a predicate
of the form xk < τk. If two variables pi and pj corre-
spond to predicates over the same variable xk < τ1 and
xk < τ2, then pi and pj can take inconsistent values with-
out additional constraints. For instance, if τ1 < τ2, then
pi = 1 and pj = 0 would be logically inconsistent because
xk < τ1 ⇒ xk < τ2, but any other valuation is possible.
For each feature variable x′k, we can ensure the consis-
tency of all p variables which reference a predicate over x′k
by adding K − 1 inequalities enforcing the implicit impli-
cation constraints between the predicates, where K is the
number of p variables referencing xk. For a given x′k, let
τ1 < · · · < τK be the sorted thresholds of the predicates
over x′k. Let p1, . . . , pK be the MILP variables correspond-
ing to predicates x′k < τ1, . . . , x
′
k < τK . A valuation of
(pi)i=1..K is consistent if and only if p1 = 1 ⇒ · · · ⇒
pK = 1. Thus the consistency constraints are:
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pK
When the feature variables x′k are binary-valued, there is a
single pi variable associated to a feature variable: all pred-
icates x′k < τ with 0 < τ < 1 are equivalent. Generally,
tree building packages generate a threshold of 0.5 in this
situation. This is however implementation dependent and
we can simplify the formulation with additional knowledge
of the value domain x′k is allowed to take.
In our toy example in figure 2, variables p0 and p1 refer to
the same feature dimension 0 and are not independent. The
predicate consistency constraint in this case is:
p1 ≤ p0
and no other predicate consistency constraint is needed.
Leaves consistency These constraints bind the p and l
variables so that the semantics of the regression trees are
preserved. Each regression tree has its own independent
set of leaves consistency constraints. We construct the con-
straints such that the following properties hold:
(i) if lk = 1, then every other li 6=k variable within the
same tree is zero, and
(ii) if a leaf variable lk is 1, then all predicate variables pi
encountered in the prediction path of the correspond-
ing leaf are forced to be either 0 or 1 in accordance
with the semantics of the prediction path, and
(iii) exactly one lk variable per tree is equal to 1. This
property is needed because (i) does not force any li to
be non-zero.
Enforcing property (i) is done using a classic exclusion
constraint. If l1, . . . , lK are the K leaf variables for a given
tree, then the following equality constraint enforces (i):
l1 + l2 + · · ·+ lK = 1 (2)
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For our toy example, this constraint is:
l1 + l2 + l3 + l4 = 1
Enforcing property (ii) requires two constraints per internal
node. Let us start at the root node r. Let proot be the variable
corresponding to the root predicate. Let lT1 , . . . , l
T
i be the
variables corresponding to the leaves of the subtree rooted
at r.true, and lF1 , . . . , l
F
j the variables for the subtree rooted
at r.false. The root predicate is true if and only if the active
prediction leaf belongs to the subtree rooted at r.true. In
terms of the MILP reduction, this means that proot is equal
to 1 if and only if one of the leaf variables of the true subtree
is set to one. Similarly on the false subtree, proot is 0 if
and only if one of the leaf variables of the false subtree is
set to one. Because only one leaf can be non-zero, these
constraints can be written as:
1−
(
lF1 + l
F
2 + · · ·+ lFj
)
= proot = l
T
1 + l
T
2 + · · ·+ lTi
The case of internal nodes is identical, except that if and
only ifs are weakened to single side implications. Indeed,
unlike the root case, it is possible that no leaf in either sub-
tree might be an active prediction leaf. For an internal node
n, let pnode be the variable attached to the node, l
T and lF
the variables attached to leaves of the true and false sub-
trees rooted at n.true and n.false. The constraints are:
1−
(
lF1 + l
F
2 + · · ·+ lFj
)
≥ pnode ≥ lT1 + lT2 + · · ·+ lTi
In our toy example, we have 3 internal nodes and thus six
constraints. The constraints associated with the root, the
leftmost and rightmost internal nodes are respectively:
l1 + l2 = p0 = 1− (l3 + l4)
l1 ≤ p1 ≤ 1− l2
l3 ≤ p2 ≤ 1− l4
Finally, property (iii) automatically holds given the previ-
ously defined constraints. To see this, one can walk down
the prediction path defined by the p variables and notice
that at each level, the leaves values of one of the subtree
rooted at the current node must be all zero. For instance, if
pnode = 1, then we have
lF1 + l
F
2 + · · ·+ lFj ≤ 0⇒ lF1 = lF2 = · · · = lFj = 0
At the last internal node, exactly two leaf variables remain
unconstrained, and one of them is pushed to zero. By the
exclusion constraint (2), the remaining leaf variable must
be set to 1.
Model mislabel Without loss of generality, consider an
original instance x such that f(x) < 0. In order for x′ to
be an evading instance, we must have f(x′) ≥ 0. Encod-
ing the model output f(x′) is straightforward given the leaf
variables l. The output of each regression tree is simply
the weighted sum of its leaf variables, where the weight of
each variable li corresponds to the prediction value vi of the
associated leaf. Hence, f(x′) is the sum of |T | weighted
sums over the l variables and the following constraint en-
forces f(x′) ≥ 0: ∑
i
vili ≥ 0
For our running example, the mislabeling constraint is:
−2l1 + l2 − l3 + 2l4 ≥ 0
Objective Finally, we need to translate the objective
d(x, x′) of problem (1). We rely on the predicate variables
p in doing so. For any distance Lρ with ρ ∈ N, there exists
weights wi and a constant C such that the MILP objective
can be written as: ∑
i
wipi + C
We now describe the construction of (wi)i and C. Recall
that for each feature dimension 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we have a
collection of predicate variables (pi)i=1..K associated with
predicates x′k < τ1, . . . , x
′
k < τK where the thresholds are
sorted τ1 < · · · < τK . Thus, the p variables effectively
encode the interval to which x′k belongs to, and any feature
value within the interval will lead to the same prediction
f(x′). There are exactly K +1 distinct possible valuations
for the binary variables p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pK and the value
domain mapping φ : p→ (R ∪ {−∞;∞})2 is:
x′k ∈ φ(p) = [τi, τi+1)
i = max{k|pk = 0, 0 ≤ k ≤ K + 1}
where by convention p0 = 0, pK+1 = 1 and τ0 = −∞,
τK+1 = ∞. Setting aside the L∞ case for now, consider
ρ ∈ N the norm we are interested in for d. Instead of di-
rectly minimizing ‖x− x′‖ρ, our formulation equivalently
minimizes ‖x−x′‖ρρ. By minimizing the latter, we are able
to consider the contributions of each feature dimension in-
dependently:
‖x− x′‖ρρ =
n∑
k=1
|xk − x′k|ρ
We take 00 = 0 by convention. At the optimal solution,
|xk − x′k|ρ can only take K + 1 distinct values. Indeed,
if x′k and xk belong to the same interval, then x
′
k = xk
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minimizes the distance along feature k, and this distance is
zero. If x′k and xk do not belong to same interval, then set-
ting x′k at the border of φ(p) that is closest to xk minimizes
the distance along k. If φ(p) = [τi, τi+1), this distance is
simply equal to min{|xk − τi|ρ, |xk − τi+1|ρ}. Note that
because of the right-open interval, the minimum distance is
actually an infimum. In our implementation, we simply use
a guard value  = 10−4 of the same magnitude order than
the numerical tolerance of the MILP solver.
Hence, we can express the minimization objective of prob-
lem (1) as a weighted sum of p variables without loss of
generality. Let 0 ≤ j ≤ K+1 be the indices such that xk ∈
[τj , τj+1). Let (wi)i=0..K+1 such that for any valid valu-
ation of p we have
∑K+1
i=0 wipi = infx′k∈φ(p) |xk − x′k|ρ.
By the discussion above and exhaustively enumerating the
K + 1 valuations of p, w is the solution to the following
K + 1 equations:
wK+1 = |xk − τK |ρ
wK + wK+1 = |xk − τK−1|ρ
. . .
wj+1 + · · ·+ wK+1 = |xk − τj+1|ρ
wj + wj+1 + · · ·+ wK+1 = 0
wj−1 + wj + wj+1 + · · ·+ wK+1 = |xk − τj − |ρ
. . .
w1 + w2 + w3 + · · ·+ wK+1 = |xk − τ2 − |ρ
w0 + w1 + w2 + w3 + · · ·+ wK+1 = |xk − τ1 − |ρ
Note that this system of linear equations is already in tri-
angular form and obtaining the w values is immediate. To
obtain the full MILP objective, we repeat this process for
every feature 1 ≤ k ≤ n and take the sum of all weighted
sums of subsets of p.
Finally, for the L∞ case, we use 1 continuous variable
b. We introduce n additional constraints to the formula-
tion, one for each feature dimension k. As per the pre-
vious discussion, we can generate the weights w such that∑K+1
i=0 wipi = infx′k∈φ(p) |xk−x′k| (this is the ρ = 1 case).
The additional constraint on dimension k is then:
K+1∑
i=0
wipi ≤ b
and the MILP objective is simply the variable b itself.
For our toy example, consider (x0 = 0, x1 = 3). In the
case of the L0 distance, we have the following objective:
1− p1 + p2
For the (squared) L2 distance instead, the objective is es-
sentially:
4− 3p0 − p1 + 4p2
For the L∞ case, our objective reduces to the variable b
and we introduce n additional bounding constraints of the
form · · · ≤ b where the left hand side measures |xk − x′k|
using the same technique as the ρ = 1 case.
Hence, the full MILP reduction of the optimal L0-evasion
for our toy instance is:
min
p,l
1− p1 + p2
s.t. p0, p1 ∈ {0; 1}; 0 ≤ l1, l2, l3, l4 ≤ 1
p1 ≤ p0 predicates consistency
l1 + l2 + l3 + l4 = 1 leaves consistency
l1 + l2 = p0 = 1− (l3 + l4) leaves consistency
l1 ≤ p1 ≤ 1− l2 leaves consistency
l3 ≤ p2 ≤ 1− l4 leaves consistency
− 2l1 + l2 − l3 + 2l4 ≥ 0 model mislabel
Additional Constraints Reducing problem (1) to a
MILP allows expressing potentially complex inter-feature
dependencies created by the feature extraction step. For in-
stance, consider the common case of K mutually exclusive
binary features x1, . . . , xK such that in any well-formed
instance, exactly one feature is non-zero. Letting pi be the
predicate variable associated with xi < 0.5, mutual exclu-
sivity can be enforced by:
K∑
i=1
pi = K − 1
4.4. Approximate Evasion
While the above reduction of problem (1) to an MILP is lin-
ear in the size of the model f , the actual solving time can
be very significant for difficult models. Thus, as a comple-
ment to the exact method, we develop an approximate eva-
sion algorithm to generate good quality evading instances.
For this part, we exclusively focus on minimizing the L0
distance. Our approximate evasion algorithm is based on
the iterative coordinate descent procedure described in al-
gorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Coordinate Descent for Problem (1)
Input: model f , initial instance x (assume f(x) < 0)
Output: evading instance x′ such that f(x′) ≥ 0
x′ ← x
while f(x′) < 0 do
x′ ← argmax
x˜′:‖x˜′−x′‖0=1
f(x˜′)
end while
In essence, this algorithm greedily modifies the single best
feature at each iteration until the sign of f(x′) changes.
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We now present an efficient algorithm for solving the inner
optimization subproblem
max
x˜:‖x−x˜‖0=1
f(x˜) (3)
The time complexity of a careful brute force approach is
high. For balanced regression trees, the prediction time
for a given instance is O
(∑
T∈T log |T.nodes|
)
. Fur-
ther, for each dimension 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we must com-
pute all possible values of f(x˜) where x˜ and x only dif-
fer along dimension k. Note that because the model pred-
icates effectively discretize the feature space, f(x˜) takes
a finite number of distinct values. This number is no
more than one plus the total number of predicates hold-
ing over feature k. Hence, we must compute f(x˜) for a
total of
∑
T∈T |T.nodes| candidates x˜ and the total run-
ning time is O
(∑
T∈T |T.nodes| ×
∑
T∈T log |T.nodes|
)
.
If we denote by |f | the size of the model which is propor-
tional to the total number of predicates, the running time is
O
(
|f ||T | log |f ||T |
)
. Tree ensembles often have thousands
of trees, making the |f ||T | dependency prohibitively ex-
pensive.
We can efficiently solve problem (3) by a dynamic pro-
gramming approach. The main idea is to visit each internal
node no more than once by computing what value of x˜ can
land us at each node. We call this approach symbolic pre-
diction in reference to symbolic program execution (King,
1976), because we essentially move a symbolic instance x˜
down the regression tree and keep track of the constraints
imposed on x˜ by all encountered predicates. Because we
are only interested in x˜ instances that are at most one fea-
ture away from x, we can stop the tree exploration early if
the current constraints imply that at least two dimensions
need to be modified or more trivially, if there is no instance
x˜ that can simultaneously satisfy all the constraints. When
reaching a leaf, we report the leaf prediction value f(x˜)
along with the pair of perturbed dimension number k and
value interval for x˜k which would reach the given leaf.
To simplify the presentation of the algorithm, we introduce
a SYMBOLICINSTANCE data structure which keeps track
of the constraints on x˜. This structure is initialized by x
and has four methods.
• For a predicate p, .ISFEASIBLE(p) returns true if and
only if there exists an instance x˜ such that ‖x˜−x‖0 ≤
1 and all constraints including p hold.
• .UPDATE(p) updates the set of constraints on x˜ by
adding predicate p.
• .ISCHANGED() returns true if and only if the current
set of constraints imply x 6= x˜.
• .GETPERTURBATION() returns the index k such that
xk 6= x˜k and the admissible interval of values for x˜k
It is possible to implement SYMBOLICINSTANCE such that
each method executes in constant time.
Algorithm 2 presents the symbolic prediction algorithm re-
cursively for a given tree. It updates a list of elements by
appending tuples to it. The first element of a tuple is the
feature index k where x˜k 6= xk, the second element is the
allowed right-open interval for x˜k, and the last element is
the prediction score f(x˜).
Algorithm 2 Recursive definition of the symbolic predic-
tion algorithm. For the first call, n is the tree root, s is a
fresh SYMBOLICINSTANCE object initialized on x with no
additional constraints and l is an empty list.
Input: node n (either internal or leaf)
Input: s of type SYMBOLICINSTANCE
Input/Output: list of tuples l (see description)
if n is a leaf then
if s.ISCHANGED() then
l← l∪{s.GETPERTURBATION(), n.prediction}
end if
else
if s.ISFEASIBLE(n.predicate) then
sT ← COPY(s)
sT .UPDATE(n.predicate)
SYMBOLICPREDICTION(n.true, sT , l)
end if
if s.ISFEASIBLE(¬n.predicate) then
s.UPDATE(¬n.predicate)
SYMBOLICPREDICTION(n.false, s, l)
end if
end if
This algorithm visits each node at most once and per-
forms at most one copy of the SYMBOLICINSTANCE s
per visit. The copy operation is proportional to the num-
ber of constraints in s. For a balanced tree T , the copy
cost is O(log |T.nodes|), so that the total running time is
O(|T.nodes| log |T.nodes|).
For each tree of the model, once the list of dimension-
interval-prediction tuples is obtained, we substract the leaf
prediction value for x from all predictions in order to obtain
a score variation between x˜ and x instead of the score for x˜.
With the help of an additional data structure, we can use the
dimension-interval-variation tuples across all trees to find
the dimension k and interval for x˜k which corresponds to
the highest variation f(x˜)− f(x). This final search can be
done in O(L logL), where L is the total number of tuples,
and is no larger than
∑
T∈T |T.leaves| by construction. To
summarize, the time complexity of our method for solving
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problem (3) is O(|f | log |f |), an exponential improvement
over the brute force method.
5. Results
We turn to the experimental evaluation of the robustness
of tree ensembles. We start by describing the evaluation
dataset and our choice of models for benchmarking pur-
poses before moving to a quantitative comparison of the ro-
bustness of boosted trees and random forest models against
a garden variety of learning algorithms. We finally show
that the brittleness of boosted trees can be effectively ad-
dressed by including fresh evading instances in the training
set during boosting.
Model Parameters Test Error
Lin. L1 C = 0.5 1.5%
Lin. L2 C = 0.2 1.5%
BDT 1,000 trees, depth 4, η = 0.02 0.25%
RF 80 trees, max. depth 22 0.20%
CPM k = 30, C = 0.01 0.20%
NN 60-60-30 sigmoidal (tanh) units 0.25%
RBF-SVM γ = 0.04, C = 1 0.25%
BDT-R 1,000 trees, depth 6, η = 0.01 0.20%
Table 1. The considered models. BDT-R is the hardened boosted
trees model introduced in section 5.4.
5.1. Dataset and Method
We choose digit recognition over the MNIST (LeCun et al.)
dataset as our benchmark classification task for three rea-
sons. First, the MNIST dataset is well studied and exempt
from labeling errors. Second, there is a one-to-one map-
ping between pixels and features, so that features can vary
independently from each other. Third, we can pictorially
represent evading instances, and this helps understanding
the models’ robustness or lack of. Our running binary clas-
sification task is to distinguish between handwritten digits
“2” and “6”. Our training and testing sets respectively in-
clude 11,876 and 1,990 images and each image has 28×28
gray scale pixels and our feature space is X = [0, 1]784.
As our main goal is not to compare model accuracies, but
rather to obtain the best possible model for each model
class, we tune the hyper-parameters so as to minimize the
error on the testing set directly. In addition to the training
and testing sets, we create an evaluation dataset of a hun-
dred instances from the testing set such that every instance
is correctly classified by all of the benchmarked models.
These correctly classified instances are to serve the purpose
of x, the starting point instances in the evasion problem (1).
5.2. Considered Models
Table 1 summarizes the 7 benchmarked models with their
salient hyper-parameters and error rates on the testing set.
For our tree ensembles, BDT is a (gradient) boosted de-
cision trees model in the modern XGBoost implementa-
tion (Chen & He) and RF is a random forest trained us-
ing scikit-learn (Buitinck et al., 2013). We also include the
following models for comparison purposes. Lin. L1 and
Lin. L2 are respectively a L1 and L2-regularized logis-
tic regression using the LibLinear (Fan et al., 2008) imple-
mentation. RBF-SVM is a regular Gaussian kernel SVM
trained using LibSVM (Chang & Lin, 2011). NN is a 3
hidden layer neural network with a top logistic regression
layer implemented using Theano (Bergstra et al., 2010)
(no pre-training, no drop-out). Finally, our last benchmark
model is the equivalent of a shallow neural network made
of two max-out units (one unit for each class) each made
of thirty linear classifiers. This model corresponds to the
difference of two Convex Polytope Machines (Kantchelian
et al., 2014) (one for each class) and we use the authors’
implementation (CPM). Two factors motivate the choice of
CPM. First, previous work has theoretically considered the
evasion robustness of such ensemble of linear classifiers
and proved the problem to be NP-hard (Stevens & Lowd,
2013). Second, unlike RBF-SVM and NN, this model can
be readily reduced to a Mixed Integer Program, enabling
optimal evasions thanks to a MIP solver. As the reduction
is considerably simpler than the one presented for tree en-
sembles above, we omit it here. Except for the two linear
classifiers, all models have a comparable, very low error
rate on the benchmark task.
Figure 4. First 4 rows: examples of optimal or best effort evading
“6” instances. Every picture is misclassified as “2” by its col-
umn model. Last row: feature importance computed as frequency
of pixel modification in the L0-evasions (darker means feature is
more often picked).
5.3. Robustness
For each learned model, and for all of the 100 correctly
classified evaluation instance, we compute the optimal (or
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Figure 3. Optimal (white boxes) or best-effort (gray boxes) evasion bounds for different metrics on the evaluation dataset. The smallest
bounds, 25-50% and 50-75% quartiles and largest bounds are shown. The red line is the median score. Larger scores mean more
deformations are necessary to change the model prediction.
best effort) solution to the evasion problem under all of
the deformation metrics. We use the Gurobi (Gurobi Op-
timization, 2015) solver to compute the optimal evasions
for all distances and all models but NN and RBF-SVM. We
use a classic projected gradient descent method for solving
the L1, L2 and L∞ evasions of NN and RBF-SVM, and
address the L0-evasion case by an iterative coordinate de-
scent algorithm and a brute force grid search at each itera-
tion. Figure 3 summarizes the obtained adversarial bounds
as one boxplot for each combination of model and dis-
tance. Although the tree ensembles BDT and RF have very
competitive accuracies, they systematically rank at the bot-
tom for robustness across all metrics. Remarkably, negli-
gible L1 or L2 perturbations suffice to evade those mod-
els. RBF-SVM is apparently the hardest model to evade,
agreeing with results from (Goodfellow et al., 2014). NN
and CPM exhibit very similar performance despite having
quite different architectures. Finally, the L1-regularized
linear model exhibits significantly more brittleness than its
L2 counterpart. This phenomenon is explained by large
weights concentrating in specific dimensions as a result of
sparsity. Thus, small modifications in the heavily weighted
model dimensions can result in large classifier output vari-
ations.
5.4. Hardening by Adversarial Boosting
We empirically demonstrate how to significantly improve
the robustness of the BDT model by adding evading in-
stances to the training set during the boosting process.
At each boosting round, we use our fast symbolic predic-
tion-based algorithm to create budgeted “adversarial” in-
stances with respect to the current model and for all the
11,876 original training instances. For a given training in-
stance x with label y and a modification budget B ≥ 1,
a budgeted “adversarial” training instance x∗ is such that
‖x−x∗‖0 ≤ B and the margin yf(x∗) is as small as possi-
ble. Here, we use B = 28, the size of the picture diagonal,
as our budget. The reason is that modifying 28 pixels over
784 is not enough to perceptually morph a handwritten “2”
into “6”. The training dataset for the current round is then
formed by appending to the original training dataset these
evading instances along with their correct labels, thus in-
creasing the size of the training set by a factor 2. Finally,
gradient boosting produces the next regression tree which
by definition minimizes the error of the augmented ensem-
ble model on the adversarially-enriched training set. After
1,000 adversarial boosting rounds, our model has encoun-
tered more than 11 million adversarial instances, without
ever training on more than 24,000 instances at a time.
We found that we needed to increase the maximum tree
depth from 4 to 6 in order to obtain an acceptable error
rate. After 1,000 iterations, the resulting model BDT-R
has a slightly higher testing accuracy than BDT (see Ta-
ble 1). Unlike BDT, BDT-R is extremely challenging to
optimally evade using the MILP solver: the branch-and-
bound search continues to expand nodes after 1 day on a
6 core Xeon 3.2GHz machine. To obtain the tightest pos-
sible evasion bound, we warm-start the solver with the so-
lution found by the fast evasion technique and report the
best solution found by the solver after an hour. Figure 3
shows that BDT-R is more robust than our previous cham-
pion RBF-SVM with respect to L0 deformations. Unfor-
tunately, we found significantly lower scores on all L1, L2
and L∞ distances compared to the original BDT model:
hardening against L0-evasions made the model more sen-
sitive to all other types of evasions.
6. Conclusion
We have presented two novel algorithms, one exact and one
approximate, for systematically computing evasions of tree
ensembles such as boosted trees and random forests. On
a classic digit recognition task, both gradient boosted trees
and random forests are extremely susceptible to evasions.
We also introduce adversarial boosting and show that it
trains models that are hard to evade, without sacrificing ac-
curacy. One future work direction would be to use these
algorithms to generate “small” evading instances for prac-
tical security systems. Another direction would be to better
understand the properties of adversarial boosting. In par-
ticular, it is not known whether this hardening approach
would succeed on all possible datasets.
Evasion and Hardening of Tree Ensemble Classifiers
Acknowledgements
This research is supported in part by Intel’s ISTC for
Secure Computing, NSF grants 0424422 (TRUST) and
1139158, the Freedom 2 Connect Foundation, US State
Dept. DRL, LBNL Award 7076018, DARPA XData Award
FA8750-12-2-0331, and gifts from Amazon, Google,
SAP, Apple, Cisco, Clearstory Data, Cloudera, Erics-
son, Facebook, GameOnTalis, General Electric, Horton-
works, Huawei, Intel, Microsoft, NetApp, Oracle, Sam-
sung, Splunk, VMware, WANdisco and Yahoo!. The opin-
ions in this paper are those of the authors and do not nec-
essarily reflect those of any funding sponsor or the United
States Government.
References
Barreno, M., Nelson, B., Sears, R., Joseph, A. D., and
Tygar, J. D. Can machine learning be secure? In
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Infor-
mation, Computer and Communications Security, ASI-
ACCS ’06, 2006.
Bergstra, J., Breuleux, O., Bastien, F., Lamblin, P., Pas-
canu, R., Desjardins, G., Turian, J., Warde-Farley, D.,
and Bengio, Y. Theano: a CPU and GPU math expres-
sion compiler. In Proceedings of the Python for Scientific
Computing Conference (SciPy), 2010.
Biggio, B., Corona, I., Maiorca, D., Nelson, B., rndi, N.,
Laskov, P., Giacinto, G., and Roli, F. Evasion attacks
against machine learning at test time. In Machine Learn-
ing and Knowledge Discovery in Databases, volume
8190 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2013.
Bru¨ckner, M., Kanzow, C., and Scheffer, T. Static predic-
tion games for adversarial learning problems. The Jour-
nal of Machine Learning Research, 13(1):2617–2654,
2012.
Buitinck, L., Louppe, G., Blondel, M., Pedregosa, F.,
Mueller, A., Grisel, O., Niculae, V., Prettenhofer, P.,
Gramfort, A., Grobler, J., Layton, R., VanderPlas, J.,
Joly, A., Holt, B., and Varoquaux, G. API design for
machine learning software: experiences from the scikit-
learn project. In ECML PKDD Workshop: Languages
for Data Mining and Machine Learning, pp. 108–122,
2013.
Chang, C.C. and Lin, C.J. LIBSVM: A library for sup-
port vector machines. ACM Transactions on Intelligent
Systems and Technology, 2, 2011.
Chen, T. and He, T. XGBoost: eXtreme Gradient Boost-
ing. https://github.com/dmlc/xgboost. Ac-
cessed: 2015-06-05.
Dalvi, N., Domingos, P., Mausam, Sanghai, S., and Verma,
D. Adversarial classification. In Proceedings of the tenth
ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge
discovery and data mining, pp. 99–108. ACM, 2004.
Fan, R.E., Chang, K.W., Hsieh, C.J., Wang, X.R., and Lin,
C.J. LIBLINEAR: A library for large linear classifica-
tion. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 9, 2008.
Fawzi, A., Fawzi, O., and Frossard, P. Analysis of clas-
sifiers robustness to adversarial perturbations. arXiv
preprint, 2014.
Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. Explain-
ing and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint,
2014.
Griva, I., Nash, S. G., and Sofer, A. Linear and Nonlinear
Optimization (2nd edition). Society for Industrial Math-
ematics, 2008.
Gu, S. and Rigazio, L. Towards deep neural network archi-
tectures robust to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint,
2015.
Gurobi Optimization, Inc. Gurobi optimizer reference
manual, 2015. URL http://www.gurobi.com.
Kantchelian, A., Tschantz, M. C., Huang, L., Bartlett, P. L.,
Joseph, A. D., and Tygar, J. D. Large-margin convex
polytope machine. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems (NIPS), 2014.
King, James C. Symbolic execution and program testing.
Communications of the ACM, 19(7):385–394, 1976.
L., Daniel. Good word attacks on statistical spam filters.
In Proceedings of the Second Conference on Email and
Anti-Spam (CEAS), 2005.
LeCun, Yann, Cortes, Corinna, and Burges, Christo-
pher J.C. MNIST dataset, 1998. URL http://yann.
lecun.com/exdb/mnist/.
Lowd, D. and Meek, C. Adversarial learning. In Proceed-
ings of the Eleventh ACM SIGKDD International Con-
ference on Knowledge Discovery in Data Mining, KDD
’05, 2005.
Nelson, B., Rubinstein, B. I. P., Huang, L., Joseph, A. D.,
Lee, S. J., Rao, S., and Tygar, J. D. Query strategies for
evading convex-inducing classifiers. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 13, May 2012.
Norouzi, M., Collins, M., Johnson, M. A, Fleet, D. J., and
Kohli, P. Efficient non-greedy optimization of decision
trees. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems (NIPS), pp. 1720–1728, 2015.
Evasion and Hardening of Tree Ensemble Classifiers
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Wu, X., Jha, S., and Swami,
A. Distillation as a defense to adversarial perturba-
tions against deep neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1511.04508, 2015.
Srndic, N. and Laskov, P. Practical evasion of a learning-
based classifier: A case study. In Proceedings of the
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, S&P
’14, 2014.
Stevens, D. and Lowd, D. On the hardness of evading com-
binations of linear classifiers. In Proceedings of the 2013
ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security,
AISec ’13, 2013.
Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan,
D., Goodfellow, I., and Fergus, R. Intriguing properties
of neural networks. arXiv preprint, 2013.
Xu, W., Qi, Y., and Evans, D. Automatically evading clas-
sifiers: A case study on PDF malware classifiers. In
Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium
(NDSS), 2016.
